Промышленный лизинг Промышленный лизинг  Методички 

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Exploiting a civic action front group to combat communist influence within cultural and intellectual circles.21

In 1968, at the same time the CIA was occupied in subverting unions dominated by the Chilean Communist Party, a US Senate committee was concluding that the Latin American labor movement had largely abandoned its revolutionary outlook: Even the Communist-dominated unions, especially those which follow the Moscow line, now generally accept the peaceful road as a viable alternative. 22

I dont see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist because of the irresponsibility of its own people. 23

Thus spoke Henry Kissinger, principal adviser to the President of the United States on matters of national security. The date was 27 June 1970, a meeting of the National Security Councils 40 Committee, and the people Kissinger suspected of imminent irresponsibility were the Chileans whom he feared might finally elect Salvador Allende as their president.

The United States did not stand by idly. At this meeting approval was given to a $300,000 increase in the anti-Allende spoiling operation which was already underway. The CIA trained its disinformation heavy artillery on the Chilean electorate, firing shells marked: An Allende victory means violence and Stalinist repression. 24 Black propaganda was employed to undermine Allendes coalition and support by sowing dissent between the Communist Party and the Socialist Party, the main members of the coalition, and between the Communist Party and the CUTCh.25

Nonetheless, on 4 September Allende won a plurality of the votes. On 24 October, the Chilean Congress would meet to choose between him and the runnerup, Jorge Alessandri of the conservative National Party. By tradition, Allende was certain to become president.

The United States had seven weeks to prevent him from taking office. On 15 September, President Nixon met with Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell. Helms handwritten notes of the meeting have become famous: One in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile! ... not concerned with risks involved ...$10,000,000 available, more if necessary ... make the economy scream ... 26

Funds were authorized by the 40 Committee to bribe Chilean congressmen to vote for Alessandri,27 but this was soon abandoned as infeasible, and under intense pressure from Richard Nixon, American efforts were concentrated on inducing the Chilean military to stage a coup and then cancel the congressional vote altogether.28 At the same time, Nixon and Kissinger made it clear to the CIA that an assassination of Allende would not be unwelcome. One White House options-paper discussed various ways this could be carried out.29

A fresh propaganda campaign was initiated in Chile to impress upon the military, amongst others, the catastrophe which would befall the nation with Allende as president. In addition to the standard communist horror stories, it was made known that there would be a cutoff of American and other foreign assistance; this was accompanied by predictions/rumors of the nationalization of everything down to small shops, and of economic collapse. The campaign actually affected the Chilean economy adversely and a major financial panic ensued.30

In private, Chilean military officers were warned that American military aid would come to a halt if Allende were seated.31



During this interim period, according to the CIA, over 700 articles, broadcasts, editorials and similar items were generated in the Latin American and European media as a direct result of Agency activity. This is apart from the real media stories inspired by the planted ones. Moreover, journalists in the pay of the CIA arrived in Chile from at least ten different countries to enhance their material with on-the-spot credibility.32

The following portion of a CIA cable of 25 September 1970 offers some indication of the scope of such media operations:

Sao Paulo, Tegucigalpa, Buenos Aires, Lima, Montevideo, Bogota, Mexico City report continued replay of Chile theme materials. Items also carried in New York Times and Washington Post. Propaganda activities continue to generate good coverage of Chile developments along our theme guidance.33

The CIA also gave inside briefings to American journalists about the situation in Chile. One such briefing provided to Time enlightened the magazine as to Allendes intention to support violence and destroy Chiles free press. This, observed the Senate report, resulted in a change in the basic thrust of the Time story.34

When Allende criticized the leading conservative newspaper El Mercurio (heavily funded by the CIA), the Agency orchestrated cables of support and protest from foreign newspapers, a protest statement from an international press association, and world press coverage of the associations protest. 35

A cable sent from CIA headquarters to Santiago on 19 October expressed concern that the coup still had

no pretext or justification that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will probably be [the militarys] claim to a coup to save Chile from communism.

One of headquarters suggestions was the fabrication of:

Firm intelligence] that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence services along Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating structure for police state ... With appropriate military contact can determine how to discover intelligence] report which could even be planted during raids planned by

Carabineros [the police].

Meanwhile, the Agency was in active consultation with several Chilean military officers who were receptive to the suggestion of a coup. (The difficulty in finding such officers was described by the CIA as a problem in overcoming the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military .)37 They were assured that the United States would give them full support short of direct military involvement. The immediate obstacle faced by the officers was the determined opposition of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Rene Schneider, who insisted that the constitutional process be followed. He would have to be removed .

In the early morn of 22 October the CIA passed sterilized machine guns and ammunition to some of the conspirators. (Earlier they had passed tear gas.) That same day, Schneider was mortally wounded in an attempted kidnap (or kidnap ) on his way to work. The CIA station in Santiago cabled its headquarters that the general had been shot with the same kind of weapons it had delivered to the military plotters, although the Agency later claimed to the Senate that the actual assassins were not the same ones it had passed the weapons to.38

The assassination did not avail the conspirators purpose. It only served to rally the army around the flag of constitutionalism; and time was running out. Two days later, Salvador Allende was confirmed by the Chilean Congress. On 3 November he took office as president.



The stage was set for a clash of two experiments. One was Allendes socialist experiment aimed at lifting Chile from the mire of underdevelopment and dependency and the poor from deprivation. The other, was, as CIA Director William Colby later put it, a prototype or laboratory experiment to test the techniques of heavy financial investment in an effort to discredit and bring down a government. 39

Although there were few individual features of this experiment which were unique for the CIA, in sum total it was perhaps the most multifarious intervention ever undertaken by the United States. In the process it brought a new word into the language: destabilization.

Not a nut or bolt [will] be allowed to reach Chile under Allende , warned then-American Ambassador Edward Korry before the confirmation.40 The Chilean economy, so extraordinarily dependent upon the United States, was the countrys soft underbelly, easy to pound. Over the next three years, new US government assistance programs for Chile plummeted almost to the vanishing point; similarly with loans from the US Export-Import Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, in which the United States held what amounted to a veto; and the World Bank made no new loans at all to Chile during 197173. US government financial assistance or guarantees to American private investment in Chile were cut back sharply and American businesses were given the word to tighten the economic noose.41

What this boycott translated into were things like the many buses and taxis out of commission in Chile due to a lack of replacement parts; and similar difficulties in the copper, steel, electricity and petroleum industries. American suppliers refused to sell needed parts despite Chiles offer to pay cash in advance.42

Multinational ITT, which didnt need to be told what to do, stated in a 1970 memorandum: A more realistic hope among those who want to block Allende is that a swiftly-deteriorating economy will touch off a wave of violence leading to a military coup. 45

In the midst of the neat disappearance of economic aid, and contrary to its warning, the United States increased its military assistance to Chile during 1972 and 1973 as well as training Chilean military personnel in the United States and Panama.44 The Allende government, caught between the devil and the deep blue sea, was reluctant to refuse this assistance for fear of antagonizing its military leaders.

Perhaps nothing produced more discontent in the population than the shortages, the little daily annoyances when one couldnt get a favorite food, or flour or cooking oil, or toilet paper, bed sheets or soap, or the one part needed to make the TV set or the car run; or, worst of all, when a nicotine addict couldnt get a cigarette. Some of the scarcity resulted from Chile being a society- in transition: various changeovers to state ownership, experiments in workers control, etc. But this was minor compared to the effect of the aid squeeze and the practices of the omnipresent American corporations. Equally telling were the extended strikes in Chile, which relied heavily on CIA financial support for their prolongation.45

In October 1972, for example, an association of private truck owners instituted a work-stoppage aimed at disrupting the flow of food and other important commodities, including in their embargo even newspapers which supported the government (subtlety was not the order of the day in this ultra-polarized country). On the heels of this came store closures, countless petit-bourgeois doing their bit to turn the screws of public inconvenience- and when they were open, many held back on certain goods, like cigarettes, to sell them on the black market to those who could afford the higher prices. Then most private bus companies stopped tunning; on top of this, various professional



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