Промышленный лизинг Промышленный лизинг  Методички 

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another Cuba-type commitment; Russians advising Allende to put his relations with the United States in order ... to ease the strain between the two countries. 66

A CIA study of 7 September 1970, three days after Allendes electoral victory, concluded:

1. The U.S. has no vital national interests within Chile. There would, however, be tangible economic losses.

2. The world military balance of power would not be significantly altered by an Allende government.

3. An Allende victory would, however, create considerable political and psychological costs:

a. Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by the challenge that an Allende government would pose to the OAS [Organization of American States], and by the reactions that it would create in other countries. ...

b. An Allende victory would represent a definite psychological set-back to the U.S and a definite psychological advantage for the Marxist idea.

The tangible economic losses likely referred to the expected nationalization of US copper-mining companies. This in fact occurred, with no compensation paid to the companies by the Unidad Popular, which calculated that due to excess profits over many years the companies actually owed Chile money.

The reactions that it would create in other countries ... What can this mean but that the people of other countries might be inspired to consider their own socialist solution to the economic and social problems that beset them? Allendes Chile might thus turn out to be that specter that haunted the corridors of official Washington: a successful example of an alternative to the capitalist model.

Washington knows no heresy in the Third World but independence. In the case of Salvador Allende independence came clothed in an especially provocative costume-a Marxist constitutionally elected who continued to honor the constitution. This would not do. It shook the very foundation stones upon which the anti-communist tower is built: the doctrine, painstakingly cultivated for decades, that communists can take power only through force and deception, that they can retain that power only through terrorizing and brainwashing the population. There could be only one thing worse than a Marxist in power-an elected Marxist in power.



Notes - PART I

Introduction

1 Michael Parenti, The Anti-Communist Impulse (Random House, NY, 1369) p.4

2 Washington Post, 24 October 1965, article by Stanley Karnow.

3 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV, The Hinge of Fate (London, 1951), p. 428.

4 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis; The Aftermath (London, 1929), p. 235.

5 D.F. Fleming, The Western Intervention in the Soviet Union, 1918-1920 , New World Review New York), Fall 1967; see also Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960 (New York, 1961), pp. 16-35.

6 Los Angeles Times, 2 September 1991, p. 1.

7 Frederick L. Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917 (New York, 1928), p. 125.

8 Ibid., p. 154.

9 San Francisco Chronicle, 4 October 1978, p. 4.

10 New Republic, 4 August 1920, a 42-page analysis by Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz.

11 Life, 29 March 1943, p. 29.

12 New York Times, 24 June 1941; for an interesting account of how US officials laid the groundwork for the Cold War during and immediately after World War 2, see the first chapter of Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (New York, 1981), a study of previously classified papers at the Eisenhower Library.

13 This has been well documented and would be common knowledge if not for its shameful implications. See, e.g., the British Cabinet papers for 1939, summarized in the Manchester Guardian, 1 January 1970; also Fleming, The Cold War, pp. 4897.

14 Related by former French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau in a recorded interview for the Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University Library; cited in Roger Morgan, The United States and West Germany, 194S-1973; A Study in Alliance Politics (Oxford University Press, London, 1974), p. 54, my translation from the French.

15 Michail Parenti, The Anti-Communist Impulse (Random House, NY, 1969) p. 35.

16 John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies (New York, 1978), p. 101. The expressions CIA officer or case officer are used throughout the present book to denote regular, full-time, career employees of the Agency, as opposed to agent , someone working for the CIA on an ad hoc basis. Other sources which are quoted, it will be seen, tend to incorrectly use the word agent to cover both categories.

17 Ibid., p. 238.

18 Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana (London, 1968), pp. 71-2.

19 The full quotation is from the New York Times, 11 January 1969, p. 1; the inside quotation is that of the National Commission.

20 Mother Jones magazine (San Francisco), April 1981, p. 5.

21 San Francisco Chronicle, 14 January 1982, p. 2.

22 Richard F. Grimmett, Reported Foreign and Domestic Covert Activities of the United States Central Intelligence Agency- 1950-1974, (Library of Congress) 18 February 1975.

23 The Pentagon Papers (N.Y. Times edition, 1971), p. xiii.

24 Speech before the World Affairs Council at the University of Pennsylvania, 13 January 1950, cited in the Republican Congressional Committee Newsletter, 20 September 1965.



25 Robert Scheer, Los Angeles Times Book Review, 27 September 1992, review of Georgi Arbatov, The System: An Insiders Life in Soviet Politics (Times Books, New York, 1992)

26 International Herald Tribune, 29 October 1992, p. 4.

27 The New Yorker, 2 November 1992, p. 6.

28 Los Angeles Times, 2 December 1988: emigration of Soviet Jews peaked at 51,330 in 1979 and fell to about 1,000 a year in the mid-1980s during the Reagan administration (1981-89); in 1988 it was at 16,572.

29 a) Frank Kofsky, Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 194S: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation (St. Martins Press, New York, 1993), passim, particularly Appendix A; the book is replete with portions of such documents written by diplomatic, intelligence and military analysts in the 1940s; the war scare was undertaken to push through the administrations foreign policy program, inaugurate a huge military buildup, and bail out the near-bankrupt aircraft industry.

b) Declassified Documents Reference System: indexes, abstracts, and documents on microfiche, annual series, arranged by particular government agencies and year of declassification.

c) Foreign Relations of the United States (Department of State), annual series, internal documents published about 25 to 35 years after the fact.

30 Los Angeles Times, 29 December 1991, p. Ml.

31 The Guardian (London), 10 October 1983, p. 9.

32 a) Anne H. Cahn, How We Got Oversold on Overkill Los Angeles Times, 23 July 1993, based on testimony before Congress, 10 June 1993, of Eleanor Chelimsky, Assistant Comptroller-General of the General Accounting Office, about a GAO study; see related story in New York Times, 28 June 1993. p.10

b) Los Angeles Times, 15 September 1991, p. 1; 26 October 1991.

c) The Guardian (London), 4 March 1983; 20 January 1984; 3 April 1986.

d) Arthur Macy Cox, Why the U.S., Since 1977, Has Been Misperceiving Soviet Military Strength , New York Times, 20 October 1980, p. 19; Cox was formerly an official with the State Department and the CIA.

33 For further discussion of these points, see:

a) Walden Bello, Dark Victory: The United States, Structural Adjustment and Global Poverty (Institute for Food and Development Policy, Oakland, CA, 1994), passim.

b) Multinational Monitor (Washington), July/August 1994, special issue on The World Bank,

c) Doug Henwood, The U.S. Economy; The Enemy Within , Covert Action Quarterly (Washington, DC), Summer 1992, No. 41, pp. 4.5-9.

d) Joel Bleifuss, The Death of Nations , In These Times (Chicago) 27 June -10 July 1994, p. 12 (UN Code).

1. CHINA 1945 to 1960s

1. David Barrett, Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yenan, 1944 (Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1970), passim; R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of Americas First CIA (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972), pp. 262-3; New York Times, 9 December 1945, p. 24.

2. Chiangs policies during and after war: Smith, pp. 259-82; New York Times, 19 December 1945, p. 2.

3. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. Two: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953 (Great Britain, 1956), p. 66.

4. Smith, p. 2S2.

5. D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960 (New York, 1961), p. 570.

6. New York Times, September-December 1945, passim; Barbara W.Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911-45 (New York, 1972), pp. 666-77,



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