Промышленный лизинг Промышленный лизинг  Методички 

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The FBI accommodated the new government by trying to track down Chilean leftists in the United States, while Secretary of State Henry Kissinger assured Pinochet that In the United States, as you know, we are sympathetic with what you are trying to do here...We wish your government well. 25

Greece, 1967-74

A military coup took place in April 1967, just two days before the campaign for national elections was to begin, elections which appeared certain to bring the veteran liberal leader George Papandreou back as prime minister. The coup had been a joint effort of the Royal Court, the Greek military, the CIA and the American military stationed in Greece, and was followed immediately by the traditional martial law, censorship, arrests, beatings and killings, the victims totaling some 8,000 in the first month. This was accompanied by the equally traditional declaration that this was all being done to save the nation from a communist takeover . Torture, inflicted in the most gruesome of ways, often with equipment supplied by the United States, became routine.

George Papandreou was not any kind of radical. He was a liberal anti-communist type. But his son Andreas, the heir-apparent, while only a little to the left of his father, had not disguised his wish to take Greece out of the Cold War, and had questioned remaining in NATO, or at least as a satellite of the United States.

Andreas Papandreou had been arrested at the time of the coup and held in prison for eight months. Shortly after his release, he and his wife Margaret visited the American ambassador, Phillips Talbot, in Athens. Papandreou related the following:

I asked Talbot whether America could have intervened the night of the coup, to prevent the death of democracy in Greece. He denied that they could have done anything about it. Then Margaret asked a critical question: What if the coup had been a Communist or a Leftist coup? Talbot answered without hesitation. Then, of course, they would have intervened, and they would have crushed the coup.

South Africa, 1960s-1980s

The CIA collaborated closely with South African intelligence, one of the principal focuses being the African National Congress, the lead-ing anti-apartheid organization which had been banned and exiled. The Agency cooperated in suppressing internal dissent, provided specific warnings of planned attacks by the ANC and information about ANC members residing in neighboring countries; on at least one occasion, in Mozambique in 1981, this led to South Africa sending an assassination squad to wipe out the fingered individuals. The CIA was also responsible for the capture of ANC leader Nelson Mandela. Additionally, for a number of years in the 1970s and 1980s, the US supported South Africa in the UN, and the CIA violated the UNs arms embargo against South Africa (of which the US was a declared supporter) by covertly providing the



country with weapons and supporting its efforts to militarily determine the political makeup of Southern Africa.26

Bolivia, 1964-75

An armed popular revolt in 1952 had defeated the military and reduced it to a small, impotent and discredited force. But under US guidance and aid, there was a slow but certain rejuvenation of the armed forces. By 1964, the military, with the indispensable support of the CIA and the Pentagon, was able to overthrow President Victor Paz, whom the United States had designated a marked man because of his refusal to support Washingtons Cuba policies. The US continued to dictate who should lead Bolivia long after.

In 1967, a CIA operation, employing some of the Agencys Cuban exile agents, tracked down Che Guevara, resulting in his summary execution.

Australia, 1972-75

The CIA channeled millions of dollars to the Labor Partys opposition, but failed to block Labors election. When the party took power in December 1972, it immediately rankled Washington by calling home Australian military personnel from Vietnam and denouncing US bombing of Hanoi, among other actions against the war. The government also displayed less than customary reverence for the intelligence and national security games so dear to the heart of the CIA. Edward Gough Whitlam, the new prime minister, was slowly but surely sealing his fate. Through complex supra-legal maneuvering, the US, the British and the Australian opposition were eventually able to induce Governor-General John Kerr-who had a long history of involvement with CIA fronts-to legally dismiss

Whitlam in 1975.

Iraq, 1972-75

As a favor to a very important ally, the Shah of Iran, President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger provided military aid to the Kurds fighting for their autonomy in Iraq, Irans perennial foe. Though the military aid was to total some $16 million, the object-unknown to the Kurds-was not to win them their autonomy, but to sap the Iraqi resources and distract them from Iran. Said a CIA memo of 1974: Iran, like ourselves, has seen benefit in a stalemate situation...in which Iraq is intrinsically weakened by the Kurds refusal to relinquish semi-autonomy. Neither Iran nor ourselves wish to see the matter resolved one way or the other. The congressional Pike Committee, later investigating the CIA, commented: This policy was not imparted to [the Kurds], who were encouraged to continue fighting. Even in the context of covert action, ours was a cynical enterprise.



In 1975, oil politics brought Iraq and Iran together, and the latter, along with the United States, abandoned the Kurds to a terrible fate. At a crucial point, the Kurds were begging Kissinger for help, but he completely ignored their pleas. Kurd forces were decimated; several hundred of their leaders were executed. Later, when questioned about this by the Pike Committee, Kissinger responded: Covert action should not be confused with missionary work. 27

Portugal, 1974-76

A bloodless military coup in 1974 brought down the US-supported 48-year fascist regime that was the worlds only remaining colonial power. This was followed by a program centered on nationalization of major industries, workers control, a minimum wage, land reform and other progressive measures. Washington and multinational officials who were on the board of directors of the planet were concerned. Destabilization became the order of the day: covert actions; attacks in the US press; subverting trade unions; subsidizing opposition media; economic sabotage through international credit and commerce; heavy financing of selected candidates in elections; a US cut-off of Portugal from certain military and nuclear information commonly available to NATO members; NATO naval and air exercises off the Portuguese coast, with 19 NATO warships moored in Lisbons harbor, regarded by most Portuguese as an attempt to intimidate the provisional government.28 The Portuguese revolution was doomed. The CIA-financed candidates took and retained power for years.

East Timor, 1975-99

While East Timor was undergoing a process of decolonization from Portugal in 1975, various political groupings were formed on the island. In August one of the parties, the UDT, attempted a coup against Portuguese rule, which was almost certainly instigated by Indonesia. A brief civil war broke out, in which a movement of the left, Fretilin, gained the upper hand. By September, Fretilin had prevailed and in November declared East Timors independence from Portugal. Nine days later, Indonesia invaded East Timor. The invasion was launched the day after US President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had left Indonesia after giving President Suharto permission to use American arms, which, under US law, could not be used for aggression. Indonesia was Washingtons most valuable ally in Southeast Asia, and, in any event, the United States was not inclined to look kindly on any leftist government.29

Indonesia soon achieved complete control over East Timor, with the help of American arms and diplomatic support. Daniel Moynihan, who was US ambassador to the UN at the time, later wrote that the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success. 30



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