Промышленный лизинг Промышленный лизинг  Методички 

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keywords are spoken. Those calls are extracted and recorded separately, to be listened to in full by humans.2 The list of specific targets at any given time is undoubtedly wide-ranging, at one point including the likes of Amnesty International and Christian Aid.3

However, the people running ECHELON are not actually superhuman: they admit they have serious technical problems; they cant always intercept the Internet as easily as theyd like; fiber-optic transmissions (which transmit a vast volume of digital data as a stream of light) pose even greater difficulties; and the data they collect is growing exponentially, overwhelmingly-sorting and analyzing the random communications in a meaningful way presents a prodigious challenge.

On the other hand, encryption expert Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems suggests that these alarms raised by NSA may be a self-interested ruse. What the agency wants us to believe-they used to be great, but these days they have trouble reading the newspaper, the Internet is too complicated for them, there is so much traffic and they cant find what they want. It may be true, but it is what they have been saying for years. Its convenient for NSA to have its targets believe it is in trouble. That doesnt mean it isnt in trouble, but it is a reason to view what spooky inside informants say with skepticism. 4 He might have added that raising such alarms also helps greatly at budget time.

ECHELON is carried out without official acknowledgment of its existence, let alone any democratic oversight or public or legislative debate as to whether it serves a human purpose. Which is to say: What gives the United States the right to do this? In Great Britain, when Members of Parliament have raised questions about the activities of the NSA and its ever-expanding base in Menwith Hill, North Yorkshire, the government has consistently refused to supply any information.

The base in England is now the NSAs largest listening post in the world. Sprawling across 560 acres, it has an operations center and on-site town, including houses, shops, a chapel, a sports center and its own uninterruptible electricity supply.5

The extensiveness of the ECHELON global network is a product of decades of intense Cold War activity. Yet with the end of the Cold War, its budget-far from being greatly reduced-has been increased, and the network has grown in both power and reach; yet another piece of evidence that the Cold War was not a battle against something called communism .

The European Parliament in recent years has been waking up to this intrusion into the continents affairs. The parliaments Civil Liberties Committee commissioned a report, which appeared in 1998 and recommended a variety of measures for dealing with the increas-ing power of the technologies of surveillance. It bluntly advised: The European Parliament should reject proposals from the United States for making private messages via the global communications network [Internet] accessible to US intelligence agencies. The report urged a fundamental review of the involvement of the NSA in Europe, suggesting that the agencys activities either be scaled down, or become more open and



accountable. It also denounced Britains role as a double-agent, spying on its own European partners. 6

It is profoundly shocking and should provoke a general outcry, Jean-Pierre Millet, a French lawyer specializing in computer crime, told the French newspaper Le Figaro. Britains European partners have a right to be furious but [the British] wont abandon their pact with the US. 7

Such concerns have been privately expressed by governments and members of the European Parliament since the end of the Cold War, but the US has continued to expand ECHELON surveillance in Europe, principally because of heightened interest in commercial espionage-to uncover industrial information that would provide American corporations with an advantage over foreign rivals.

German security experts have found that ECHELON is engaged in heavy commercial spying in Europe. Victims have included such German firms as the wind generator manufacturer Enercon. In 1998, Enercon developed what it thought was a secret invention, enabling it to generate electricity from wind power at a far cheaper rate than before. However, when the company tried to market its invention in the United States, it was confronted by its American rival, Kenetech, which announced that it had already patented a near-identical development. Kenetech then brought a court order against Enercon to ban the sale of its equipment in the US. In a rare public disclosure, an NSA employee, who refused to be named, agreed to appear in silhouette on German television to reveal how he had stolen Enercons secrets. He said he used satellite information to tap the telephone and computer link lines that ran between Enercons research laboratory and its production unit some 12 miles away. Detailed plans of the companys invention were then passed on to Kenetech.8

In 1994, Thomson SA, located in Paris, and Airbus Industrie, based in Blagnac, France, also lost lucrative contracts, snatched away by American rivals aided by information covertly collected by the NSA and CIA.9 The same agencies also eavesdropped on Japanese representatives during negotiations with the United States in 1995 over auto parts trade. 10

German industry complains that it is in a particularly vulnerable position because the government forbids its security services from conducting similar industrial espionage. German politicians still support the rather naive idea that political allies should not spy on each others businesses. The Americans and the British do not have such illusions, said journalist Udo Ulfkotte, a specialist in European industrial espionage.11

In 1999, Germany demanded that the United States recall three CIA operatives for their activities in Germany involving economic espionage. The news report stated that the Germans have long been suspicious of the eavesdropping capabilities of the enormous U.S. radar and communications complex at Bad Aibling, near Munich , which is in fact an NSA intercept station. The Americans tell us it is used solely to monitor communications by potential enemies, but how can we be entirely sure that they are not



picking up pieces of information that we think should remain completely secret? asked a senior German official. 12 Japanese officials most likely have been told a similar story by Washington about the more than a dozen signals intelligence bases which Japan has allowed to be located on its territory.13

The European Union and the FBI

Despite all the above expressed misgivings, the Council (or Council of Ministers) of the European Union has been working closely with the FBI since the early 1990s to develop a system for intercepting telecommunications in its member countries to serve the law enforcement community (police, immigration, customs, and internal security). ECHELON, by contrast, is run by and serves the military-intelligence community.

Known as the EU-FBI telecommunications surveillance system (sometimes referred to as ENFOPOL), it would carry tapping of the Internet to a new level. Specialized software would be installed at Internet Service Providers (ISP) which would be remotely ( virtually ) controlled by law enforcement agencies. The effect would be to automate the interception of messages. How feasible this is technically remains to be seen.

Furthermore, if the ISPs provided encoding, compression or encryption to one of their customers, they would have to provide it en clair (decrypted) to the law enforcement agencies. ISPs and network operators (e.g., satellite communications networks) would not be granted new or extended operating licenses at national level unless they complied.

Like much in the EU-FBI agreement, these requirements are inspired by the FBI. Its something the Bureau couldnt get away with at home. There has been strong resistance from some of the communication companies in Europe as well, but the master plan proceeds unfazed, putting forth recommendations about amendments to national laws to ensure that surveillance will be possible within the new systems . The plans include extending the system to countries outside the European Union.

As of the end of 1999, the final draft of the agreement was not yet ready to be submitted to EU states for ratification; one reason for the delay was that various security services had been exerting full-court presses to maximize surveillance coverage and minimize control and accountability.14

Encryption

In their quest to gain access to more and more private information, the NSA, the FBI and other components of the US national security establishment have been engaged for years in a campaign to require American telecommunications manufacturers and carriers to design their equipment and networks to optimize the authorities wiretap-ping ability, and to impose a national civilian cryptography standard designed to allow the government to decode encrypted communica-tions at will. The power to favor or block approval of a companys exports has been one of the carrot-and-stick tools employed by the security



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