Промышленный лизинг Промышленный лизинг  Методички 

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CHAPTER 23 : How the CIA Sent Nelson Mandela to Prison for 28

Years

When Nelson Mandela was released from prison in February 1990, President George Bush personally telephoned the black South African leader to tell him that all Americans were rejoicing at his release . 1

This was the same Nelson Mandela who was imprisoned for almost 28 years because the CIA tipped off South African authorities as to where they could find him.

And this was the same George Bush who was once the head of the CIA and who for eight years was second in power of an administration whose CIA and National Security Agency collaborated closely with the South African intelligence service, providing information about Mandelas African National Congress.2 The ANC was a progressive nationalist movement whose influence had been felt in other African countries; accordingly it had been perceived by Washington as being part of the legendary International Communist Conspiracy. In addition to ideology, other ingredients in the cooking pot the United States and South Africa both ate from was that the latter served as an important source of uranium for the United States, and the US was South Africas biggest supporter at the United Nations.

On August 5, 1962, Nelson Mandela had been on the run for 17 months when armed police at a roadblock outside Howick, Natal flagged down a car in which he was pretending to be the chauffeur of a white passenger in the back seat. How the police came to be there was not publicly explained. In late July 1986, however, stories appeared in three South African newspapers (picked up shortly thereafter by the London press and, in part, CBS-TV) which shed considerable light on the question. The stories told of how a CIA officer, Donald C. Rickard by name, under cover as a consular official in Durban, had tipped off the Special Branch that Mandela would be disguised as a chauffeur in a car headed for Durban. This was information Rickard had obtained through an informant in the ANC. One year later, at a farewell party for him in South Africa, at the home of the notorious CIA mercenary Colonel Mad Mike Hoare, Rickard himself, his tongue perhaps loosened by spirits, stated in the hearing of some of those present that he had been due to meet Mandela on the fateful night, but tipped off the police instead. Rickard refused to discuss the affair when approached by CBS-TV. 3

CBS-TV newsman Allen Pizzey did interview journalist James Tomlins on the air when the story broke in 1986. Tomlins, who was in South Africa in 1962, stated that Rickard had told him of his involvement in Mandelas capture. 4

On June 10, 1990, The Atlanta Journal and Constitution reported that an unidentified, retired US intelligence officer had revealed that within hours of Mandelas arrest, Paul Eckel, then a senior CIA operative, had told him: We have turned Mandela over to the South African security branch. We gave them every detail, what he would be wearing,



the time of day, just where he would be. They have picked him up. It is one of our greatest coups. 5

After Mandelas release, the White House was asked if Bush would apologize to the South African for the reported US involvement in his arrest at an upcoming meeting between the two men. In this situation, a categorical denial by the White House of any American involvement in the arrest would have been de rigueur. However, spokesman Marlin Fitzwater replied: This happened during the Kennedy administration...dont beat me up for what the Kennedy people did. 6

The CIA stated: Our policy is not to comment on such allega-tions. This is what the Agency says when it feels that it has nothing to gain by issuing a statement. On a number of other occasions, because it thought that it would serve their purpose, the CIA has indeed commented on all kinds of allegations.

While Mandelas youth and health ebbed slowly away behind prison walls, Donald Rickard retired to live in comfort and freedom in Pagosa Springs, Colorado. He resides there still today.

CHAPTER 24 : The CIA and Drugs: Just Say Why Not?

In my 30-year history in the Drug Enforcement Administration and related agencies, the major targets of my investigations almost invariably turned out to be working for the

CIA.

Dennis Dayle, former chief of an elite DEA enforcement unit 1 1947 to 1951, France

Corsican and Mafia criminal syndicates in Marseilles, Sicily and Corsica-benefiting from CIA arms, money and psychological warfare-suppressed strikes and wrestled control of labor unions from the Communist Party. In return, the CIA smoothed the way for the gangsters to be left unmolested, and unindicted, and to reestablish the heroin racket that had been restrained during the war-the famous French Connection that was to dominate the drug trade for more than two decades and was responsible for most of the heroin entering the United States.2

1950s to early 1970s, Southeast Asia

The Nationalist Chinese army, defeated by the communists in 1949 and forced into exile, became part of an army formed by the CIA in Burma to wage war against Communist China. The Agency closed its eyes to the fact that their new clients were becoming the opium barons of the Golden Triangle (parts of Burma, Thailand and Laos), the worlds



largest source of opium and heroin. Air America, the CIAs principal airline proprietary, flew the drugs all over Southeast Asia, to sites where the opium was processed into heroin, and to trans-shipment points on the route to Western customers.3

During the US military involvement in Vietnam and Laos, the CIA worked closely with certain tribal peoples and warlords engaged in opium cultivation. In exchange for tactical or intelligence support from these elements, the Agency protected their drug operations. Air America pilots were again engaged in flying opium and heroin throughout the area to serve the personal and entrepreneurial needs of the CIAs various military and political allies, at times lining their own pockets as well; on occasion, the proceeds also helped finance CIA covert actions off budget; ultimately, the enterprise turned many GIs in Vietnam into heroin addicts.

The operation was not a paragon of discretion. Heroin was refined in a laboratory located on the site of CIA headquarters in northern Laos. After two decades of American military intervention, Southeast Asia had become the source of 70 percent of the worlds illicit opium and the major supplier for Americas booming heroin market. 4

1973-80, Australia

The Nugan Hand Bank of Sydney had close, if not to say intimate, ties to the CIA. Among the banks officers were a network of US generals, admirals and former (or former ) CIA men, including William Colby, recently the Agencys director, who was one of the banks lawyers. Bank Co-founder Michael Hand had been a Green Beret and CIA contract agent in Laos, working with Air America. Many of the depositors whose money first helped the bank get started were Air America employees.

The bank rapidly expanded, with branches in Saudi Arabia, Europe, Southeast Asia, South America and the US. It became one of the banks of choice for international drug traffickers (whom Nugan Hand actively solicited), money launderers, arms dealers and the CIA (which used the bank for its payouts for covert operations). In 1980, amidst several mysterious deaths, the bank collapsed, $50 million in debt.5

1970s and 1980s, Panama

For more than a decade, Panamanian strongman General Manuel Noriega was a highly paid CIA asset and collaborator, despite knowledge by US drug authorities as early as 1971 that the general was heavily involved in drug trafficking and money laundering. Noriega facilitated guns-for-drugs flights for the Nicaraguan Contras, provid-ing protection and pilots; safe havens for drug cartel officials; and discreet banking facilities for all. Yet, US officials, including CIA Director William Webster and several Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers, sent Noriega letters of praise for his efforts to thwart drug trafficking (albeit only against competitors of his Medellin Cartel patrons). William Casey, who became CIA Director in 1981, declared that he didnt denounce



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